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I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 867 584 872 The most important duties of a father toward his son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to

593 852 [872] [583] Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.

[179] In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family

593 852 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no

178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In

[626] [481] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

585 178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.

584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle, [583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's 584 * 613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period of one week during which time any member of the girl's 584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed [695] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts: the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers, and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). After [431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.

585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

*613 582 [423] 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

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*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

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•583 554 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's 583 554 556 435 place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially where an infringement of it could result in a change of his tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce. Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to her father's house and the father must then return the price of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father, in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qaṣr: the original mahr is paid at
[768] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also
583 at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama
768 ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband
595 takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 The second divorce case which happened while I was
158 in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. It then be-
586 comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for
587 his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right
593 to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity,
583 or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

Still, according to the unofficial estimates, only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that should be kept away from the State legal system.

Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

593 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
595 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
584 bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
[431] choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[999] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

The bride's father did not have to pay kabara, although he held a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom, his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father. The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr, he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters. This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000 pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endogamous marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son, "ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the

582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in

582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen. In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen

[583] is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-

582 wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore, the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

582 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a gen-
779 eral feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final,
431 the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bride-
583 wealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the
779 bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a signifi-
431 cant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bride-wealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
43 herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[178] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
[171] for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
[586] remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law, unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr. The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad) for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property for the woman.

583 [584] Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but 583 178 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money. This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and 583 178 184 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock, but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the 583 [584] [182] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife. 583 593 586 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked. [591] [592] This is especially important among Awlad Ali, where, although the marriage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's household even after marriage.

593 606 557 586 [114] The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the area before any solution to the case was achieved.

584 578 606 [574] [575] Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the Zeheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and respected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein suggested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival of the new wife.

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586 Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having raised his daughter, is entitled to her obedience and that taking her away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her, to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her husband or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the definition of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a [681] justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he considers as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses, [681] the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his [583] wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

593 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
586 on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
583 daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the family, which means that she is left without any support or protection. A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
562 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
593 the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old, her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
593 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
562 have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective
583

husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr. In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby. Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his daughter.

If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since she is still a member of that family.

of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gathered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this respect, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The compensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her adultery.

681 this variation is the fact that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
426 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
593 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
681 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
684 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, uten-
558 siles, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is paid.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
671 Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his s[illegible] duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
586 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
593 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
629 married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
598 If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
681 her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
558 the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
114 is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
178 work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
583 when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience for the wife's family.

Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedience is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes. Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back. Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe, and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Because my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the family for some reason or another.

From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission. When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage, and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision, and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons; few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

[10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes neces-
602 sary for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor, can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
(583) substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day, there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue instalment of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too, the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances, another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there, breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed, corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs of the whole group, and its members then live together in one camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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121 613 682 674 829 604 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma. The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,

121 613 604 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of [554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local [582] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give [584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies [429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian, and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men [422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth [583] from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 613 606 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 613 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important, that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself. With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[178] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka* (divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram* extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
● 583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

[171] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature, but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if relations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not uncommon for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate. At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is involved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which marriage to the first cousin on either side is permitted.

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates. 582 602

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion, thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them. [613] [613] [554] [182]

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage. These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip 582 583 [613] [602]

Cases

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
•583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[18] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically on the page following.

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was "put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and,

[18] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

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the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise.

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

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Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

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The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

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Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).